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THE PROMISE AND PROBLEM OF BIOLOGICS 
Michael A. Sanzo† 
Biologics are drugs derived from living organisms and are 
typically too complex to be fully characterized or chemically 
synthesized. They represent some of the most promising new therapies 
in the United States and are already extensively used in the treatment 
of autoimmune diseases and several types of cancer. Unfortunately, the 
cost these drugs is often so high that much of the U.S. population 
cannot afford them. 
In 2010, Congress enacted the Biologic Price Competition and 
Innovation Act (“BPCIA”), whose purpose was designed to promote 
the development of biosimilars. These are drugs that are similar 
enough to a previously-approved pioneer drug that they can be 
marketed with less testing. While it is still too early to ascertain how 
the BPCIA will affect the price of biologics, economic considerations 
and results from the first-marketed biosimilar suggest that its effect will 
be modest. 
This Article argues that part the reason for the unpromising 
outlook regarding the effect of the BPCIA is that it fails to provide 
adequate incentives for companies to innovate—particularly methods 
of producing biologics more reliably and at a lower cost. In the 
absence of improvement in this area, the effect of biosimilars on the 
price of biologics is likely to be insufficient to make these drugs more 
affordable. This Article suggests alternative incentives that may help 
the BPCIA better achieve its intended purpose. 
  
																																								 																				
† Michael A. Sanzo is a patent attorney whose clients innovate in the areas of biotechnology, 
chemistry, and pharmaceuticals. He may be contacted at mike@msanzolaw.com. 
2017] THE PROMISE AND PROBLEM OF BIOLOGICS 79 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 80	
I.  LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND .......................................................... 82	
A.	 Historical Framework ........................................................... 82	
B.	 Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. ...................... 85	
II.  THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT ......................................................... 87	
A.	 Provisions of Primary Benefit to Proprietary Manufacturers .. 
  .............................................................................................. 87	
1.	 Market Exclusivity ............................................................. 87	
2.	 Establishment of the “Orange Book” ................................. 88	
3.	 Litigation Under Hatch-Waxman Act (Automatic 30-Month 
Stay) ........................................................................................... 88	
4.	 Patent Term Restoration .................................................... 89	
B.	 Provisions of Primary Benefit to Generic Manufacturers .... 91	
1.	 Abbreviated New Drug Applications ................................. 91	
2.	 Safe Harbor for Testing ..................................................... 92	
3.	 Market Exclusivity ............................................................. 92	
III.  COMPARING PROVISIONS OF THE BPCIA TO HATCH-WAXMAN 93	
A.	 Provisions of Primary Interest to Proprietary Manufacturers . 
  .............................................................................................. 93	
1.	 Patent Term Restoration .................................................... 93	
2.	 Market Exclusivity ............................................................. 94	
B.	 Provisions of Primary Benefit to Follow-On Manufacturers ... 
  .............................................................................................. 94	
1.	 Safe Harbor for Testing ..................................................... 94	
2.	 Abbreviated Path to Licensing ........................................... 95	
3.	 Market Exclusivity ............................................................. 96	
C.	 Litigation Under the BPCIA (The “Patent Dance”) ............ 97	
1.	 Phase 1: Negotiation and Early Litigation ......................... 97	
2.	 Phase 2: Pre-Commercialization Litigation ....................... 99	
3.	 Limitations on Relief ......................................................... 99	
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF HATCH-WAXMAN TO THE BPCIA .......... 99	
80 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 34 
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF METHODS OF PRODUCTION ...................... 100	
VI. FINDING THE RIGHT MIX OF INCENTIVES .................................. 101	
A.	 Expanding the Use of the Purple Book ............................... 102	
B.	 Using Total and Partial Exclusivity Periods ...................... 103	
C.	 Promoting Innovation and Competition ............................. 104	
D.	 Expanding Patent Term Restoration ................................... 106	
E.	 Expanding the Safe Harbor ................................................ 106	
F.	 Promoting Improvements in Methods of Manufacturing 
Biologics ...................................................................................... 107	
G.	 Litigation ............................................................................. 108	
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 109	
	
INTRODUCTION 
Many of our most effective therapeutic agents are derived from 
living organisms and are too large or too complex to be chemically 
synthesized.1 These are termed “biologics” and include vaccines, cells, 
gene therapy agents, tissues, recombinant proteins, monoclonal 
antibodies, cytokines, and immunomodulators.2 Current biologics 
having global sales of five billion dollars or more include Humira® for 
the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis; Rituxan® for Non-Hodgkins 
lymphoma; Avastin® for breast, colorectal, and ovarian cancer; 
Harvoni® for hepatitis C and Seretide® for asthma.3 
In addition to being among the most effective therapeutics, 
biologics are also among the most expensive. In 2013, Express Scripts 
(the largest third-party manager of prescription drug programs in the 
U.S.) reported that biologics then on the market typically cost $1,000 
to over $50,000 per treatment. In some instances, biologics cost 
patients hundreds of thousands of dollars per year.4 Healthcare plans 
do not always fully cover these drugs,5 and many people diagnosed 
																																								 																				
 1. Going Large, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2014), http://bit.do/GoingLarge. 
 2. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA 101: Regulating Biological Products, (July 28, 
2005), http://bit.do/FDAWhatBiologicalProducts. 
 3.  Ann M. Thayer, Leading Drugs Under Fire In 2015, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING 
NEWS, Dec. 7, 2015, at 19, 19; see also Kathlyn Stone, The Top 10 Biologic Drugs in the United 
States, BALANCE (Oct. 13, 2016), http://bit.do/Top10BiologicDrugs.  
 4. Steve Miller, The $250 Billion Potential of Biosimilars, EXPRESS SCRIPTS (Apr. 23, 
2013), http://bit.do/ExpressScripts_Biosimilars. 
 5.  How to Get Your Health Plan to Cover Specialty Drugs, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2013), 
http://bit.do/CNBC_SpecialtyDrugs. 
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with chronic, or even lethal, diseases cannot afford the best and in some 
cases, the only treatment available.6 Moreover, the strain of these high-
priced drugs on total healthcare cost in the U.S. is getting worse as their 
market share of the pharmaceutical market increases.7 
Part of the reason for the high cost of biologics is inherent. The 
complex structure of these drugs makes them much more difficult to 
produce than chemically-synthesized small molecules and creates a 
need for more testing.8 An additional reason is that, because of natural 
variability in biological organisms and purification procedures, it is 
essentially impossible to produce a generic version of a pioneer drug.9 
Congress attempted to address this problem in the Biologic Price 
Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”), which came into law as 
Title VII of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (sometimes 
referred to as “Obamacare” ).10 The basic rationale for the BPCIA is 
that, even if generics in the traditional sense are not available for 
biologics, it may still be possible to develop compounds that are similar 
enough to allow them to be used as clinical alternatives without the full 
degree of testing otherwise required.11   
Thus far, the BPCIA has had only limited success. The first 
biosimilar, Zarxio, did not arrive on the market until September of 
2015, more than five years after the BPCIA became law, and at a price 
only 15% lower than its reference product, Neupogen.12 Part of the 
reason for the delay may have been that the legislation was so poorly 
																																								 																				
 6.  Lacie Glover, Why Are Biologic Drugs So Costly?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://bit.do/USNews_BiologicDrugsCostly. 
 7. Mari Serebrov, Biologics' Share of Medicine Chest Grows, and So Do the Pricing 
Concerns, BIOWORLD TODAY (Mar. 9, 2015), http://bit.do/BioWorld_ShareofMedicineChest. 
 8.  Glover, supra note 6. 
 9. Brian Palmer, The $8,000 Pill, SLATE (Aug. 16, 2010), http://bit.do/Slate_8000Pill; see 
also JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34045, FDA REGULATION OF FOLLOW-
ON BIOLOGICS 7-5700, at 5-6 (2010). The term “generic,” as used herein, refers to a copy of a 
proprietary drug that is structurally identical and essentially identical in all other respects to a 
pioneer drug. The term “pioneer drug” refers to a chemical entity that has been approved or 
licensed for marketing as a drug in the U.S. for the first time. 
 10.  Ryan Timmis, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Potential 
Problems in the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 216 
(2015). 
 11.  Id. at 215. 
 12.  Ben Hirschler & Michael Shields, Novartis Launches First U.S. 'Biosimilar' Drug at 
15 Percent Discount, REUTERS HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 3, 2015), http://bit.do/Reuters_Novartis. 
Zarxio had been approved on March 6, 2015. Sabrina Tavernise & Andrew Pollak, F.D.A. 
Approves Zarxio, Its First Biosimilar Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1EvptpC. 
Four other biosimilars have been subsequently approved and several other applications are 
nearing approval. Kiran Panesar, Biosimilars: Current Approvals and Pipeline Agents, 41 U.S. 
PHARMACIST 26, 26-29 (Oct. 14, 2016). The term “reference product” refers to a previously 
approved drug that the generic attempts to replicate. 
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drafted and so convoluted that the Federal Circuit, borrowing a quote 
from Winston Churchill, referred to it as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery 
inside an enigma.”13 Unsurprisingly, substantial litigation over various 
statutory interpretations of the BPCIA, as well as how to resolve those 
inconsistencies, has occurred, and its case law continues to evolve.14  
The present paper argues that revisions are needed in this 
legislation not only to clarify its terms, but also because it fails to 
provide adequate incentives for the development of innovative 
production methods that will be crucial to a substantial reduction in the 
cost of biologics.15 Amendments are suggested that may better induce 
biosimilar manufacturers to develop more efficient means of 
production without compromising the incentives that exist for 
proprietary drug manufacturers to develop new biological products. 
I.  LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND  
A. Historical Framework 
Throughout the 1800s, there was a remarkable absence of 
regulation governing the way in which drugs in the U.S. are approved, 
manufactured, and sold.16 The only major regulatory legislation passed 
by Congress during this period was the Drug Importation Act of 1848.17 
This Act prohibited unsafe or adulterated drugs from being imported 
but did not have any effect on drug products made in the U.S. The latter 
																																								 																				
 13.  Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The phrase was 
taken from Winston Churchill in a speech he gave on Russia on October 1, 1939. 
 14.  Id. at 1353. The biosimilar applicant for Zarxio, Sandoz, has been in litigation with the 
reference drug owner, Amgen, since October of 2014 over contradictory statutory requirements 
and the case is now slated for consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court. Jason Rantanen, Supreme 
Court to Review BPCIA, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 14, 2017), http://bit.do/PatentlyO_AmgenvSandoz. 
Close on the heels of this case is a second case, Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016), which is concerned with the interpretation of essentially the same provisions. See also 
Kurt R. Karst, Feeling Dissed, Amgen Sues After Sandoz Abandons the BPCIA Patent Dance 
Procedures for NEUPOGEN Biosimilar, FDA LAW BLOG, (Oct. 29, 2014), 
http://bit.do/FDALawBlog_FeelingDissed. 
 
 15.  By most estimates, it is likely that the ACA will soon be substantially revised and that 
the section concerned with biosimilars will be either kept or reintroduced. This may give Congress 
an opportunity to reexamine the BPCIA in light of developments since its passage. Zachary 
Brennan, Cassidy Says Obamacare Repeal Will Not Repeal Biosimilars Approval Pathway, REG. 
AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y (Dec. 7, 2016), http://bit.do/RAPS_CassidySays. 
 16.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., The History of Drug Regulation in the U.S. (Sept. 24, 
2015), http://bit.do/FDA_CDERBrochure. 
 17. Angela Walsh, An In-Depth Look at The Import Drugs Act of 1848 (2002), 
http://bit.do/SpuriousSolution. See also Dennis B. Worthen, Pharmaceutical Legislation: A 
Historical Perspective, 10 INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOUNDING 20, 21 (2006). 
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could be sold without regard to efficacy or safety and without even 
disclosing what they contained.18 
In such an atmosphere, disaster is inevitable, and it arrived in the 
fall of 1901.19 At that time, diphtheria patients were routinely treated 
with an antiserum derived from horses. On September 30, antiserum 
was collected from a horse in St. Louis who, two days later, died of a 
tetanus infection.20 The antiserum was recalled, but not before a fatal 
dose had been administered to thirteen children.21 In response to this, 
and a similar incident in New Jersey that resulted in death of nine 
children, Congress passed the Biologics Control Act of 1902.22 This 
legislation was the first to require pre-market approval of drugs by the 
federal government.23 In 1944, the Biologics Act became the Public 
Health Service Act, and this is currently the legislation under which 
most biologics are regulated.24  
A second major health safety act, the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 
was passed by Congress in 1906. In its initial form, this legislation 
prohibited the interstate transport or sale of adulterated or misbranded 
drugs,25 including all preparations in the United States Pharmacopoeia 
or National Formulary.26 Despite its name, however, the Pure Food and 
																																								 																				
 18.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 16; see also Walsh, supra note 17. 
 19. Ross E. DeHovitz, The 1901 St. Louis Incident: The First Modern Medical Disaster, 
133 PEDIATRICS 964, 965 (2014); see also Valerie Marshall et al., Food and Drug Administration 
Regulation and Evaluation of Vaccines, 127 PEDIATRICS S23, S24 (May 2011). 
 20.  DeHovitz, supra note 19, at 964. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 STAT. 728 (1902) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262); Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of 
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 682-83 
(2010).  
 23. JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34045, FDA REGULATION OF 
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 7-5700, at 5-6 (2010).  
 24. Id.  
 25. Section 8 of the Act defined the term “misbranded” as applying to any drugs which are 
sold in conjunction with false or misleading statements about the drug or its ingredients. The 
federal government initially used this provision as a basis for acting against drugs with unfounded 
claims for curative effects. History of Federal Regulation: 1902–Present, FDAREVIEW.ORG 
(2016), http://bit.do/FDAReview_History [hereinafter History of Federal Regulation]. However, 
in 1911, the Supreme Court held that the statute did not cover all false or misleading statements, 
but only those concerned with the identity of the article and possibly including its strength, quality, 
and purity. Claims to cure for cancer, baldness etc., were outside the scope of the Act. See United 
States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497 (1911). In response to this decision, Congress passed the 
Sherley Amendment in 1912. However, this applied only to claims that the seller knew to be false 
and, like the 1906 legislation, was confined to statements made on labeling and not advertising. 
History of Federal Regulation. 
 26. History of Federal Regulation, supra note 25; Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. 
L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (amended 1912). The law appointed the Bureau of Chemistry 
of the Department of Agriculture to carry out the testing of drugs on the market. This Bureau 
eventually became the FDA. 
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Drugs Act did little to actually prevent adulterated drugs from getting 
to the market. Unlike the Biologics Control Act, it did not require the 
pre-market testing of drug products.27  
It was not until 1938 that this deficiency was addressed when the 
Act of 1906 was replaced with the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act (“FDCA”). This required drug manufacturers to file a new drug 
application (“NDA”) prior to marketing, in which they demonstrate the 
safety of their proposed product.28 Remarkably, however, the FDA had 
only 60 days from the date of filing to disapprove an application or the 
applicant was free to begin marketing.29 Also, there still was no 
requirement that a drug maker show that its product actually worked.  
Finally, in 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Drug 
Amendment, which compelled drug makers to demonstrate that its 
proposed product is both safe and effective.30 Drugs that were approved 
prior to 1962 were evaluated by a committee that made a 
recommendation as to their efficacy.31 In cases where this review 
suggested that continued marketing of a drug was warranted, the 
legislation provided that a generic version could be approved by the 
filing of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), which 
demonstrated chemical identity and bioequivalence.32 For most drugs 
approved after 1962, a generic only required the filing of a “paper 
NDA,” in which safety and efficacy could be established based in part 
on citations to published reports.33 
																																								 																				
 27. History of Federal Regulation, supra note 25. 
 28. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 5-6; see also Frederick R. Ball et al., Generic Drugs: 
ANDAS, Section 505(b)(2) Applications, Patents, and Exclusivities, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND 
REGULATION, 376-78 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014). As an alternative to submitting 
an NDA, a drug could be approved if it was generally recognized as safe (GRAS). In cases where 
a drug had already been approved and a second manufacturer was attempting to get approval of 
the same drug, the GRAS option allowed a manufacturer to avoid safety testing and market a 
generic. See History of Federal Regulation, supra note 25. 
 
 29.  Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 30. Ball et al., supra note 28, at 376-78. Like in a great deal of FDA legislation, the 
Kefauver-Harris Amendment was prompted by a disaster—the sale of the morning sickness drug 
thalidomide in Canada and Europe and the ensuing births of severely-deformed babies. A similar 
fate was averted in the U.S. largely due to the intransigence of a single FDA Medical Officer, 
Frances O. Kelsey. See Robert D. McFadden, Frances Oldham Kelsey, Who Saved U.S. Babies 
From Thalidomide, Dies at 101, N.Y. TIMES A1 (Aug. 7, 2015). 
 31. Ball et al., supra note 28, at 376-78. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 377-78. Forty-seven paper NDAs were approved by FDA between January 1979 
and June 1983, resulting in generic versions of 19 drugs. Edward Tabor, Generic Drug Approvals 
in the U.S. Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, REGULATORY FOCUS 50, 52 (Sept. 2008). A different 
procedure existed for antibiotics and insulin. 
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From the viewpoint of the proprietary drug industry, the primary 
effect of the testing requirements imposed by the Kefauver-Harris Drug 
Amendment was that it decreased the number of drugs that made it to 
the market and greatly increased the development cost of the drugs that 
did.34 In addition, the Amendment resulted in a reduction in the 
effective life of any relevant patents that issued before a drug was 
approved for marketing.35 
There were also problems for generic manufacturers wanting to 
replicate drugs approved after 1962. The FDA never extended the 
ANDA policy that it had established under the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendment for pre-1962 drugs and the paper NDA procedure was 
hampered by an absence of adequate publications for many drugs.36 
Even though the FDA possessed studies establishing the safety and 
efficacy of the products that generic companies were attempting to 
replicate, these studies were considered to be the confidential property 
of the proprietary drug sponsor and were not made available to generic 
applicants.37   
B. Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. 
The state of the drug approval process in the U.S. after 1962 can 
be seen in Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., a case decided 
by the Federal Circuit in 1984.38 The facts in this case are quite simple. 
Roche had a patent covering a sedative that it had marketed under the 
brand name “Dalmane.”39 Bolar was interested in marketing a generic 
version of the drug in 1984, as soon as the patent expired.40 In order to 
gain access to the market as soon as possible, Bolar began 
bioequivalency studies needed for FDA approval in mid-1983 and, 
based on this activity, Roche filed suit for patent infringement in the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey.41 The case was then 
transferred to the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 
																																								 																				
 34. Dale H. Geiringer, The Safety and Efficacy of New Drug Approval, 5 CATO J. 177, 178 
(1985) (citing a 1980 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office). Mr. Geiringer indicates that 
by 1976, the cost of developing a new drug was ten to twenty times higher than in the early 1960s. 
See also Jeremy A. Greene et al., Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals—The Kefauver–
Harris Amendments at 50, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1481 (Oct. 18, 2012). 
 35. At that time, a patent term ran for 17 years from the date of issuance and, as a result, 
the life of an issued patent eroded during FDA testing. 
 36. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28872, 28872-74 (July 
10, 1989) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314, & 320). 
 37. Id. 
 38.  Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (1984). 
 39. Id. at 860. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
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which held that Bolar was not liable because its use of the patented 
drug was “de minimis and experimental.”42 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit offered an interesting assessment 
of the effect of the Kefauver Amendment on the drug approval process: 
The new drug approval procedure which existed between 1938 
and 1962 was relatively innocuous and had little impact on the 
development of pioneer prescription new drugs. Section 505 of the 
FDCA required the manufacturer of a pioneer new drug to submit 
to the FDA a New Drug Application (NDA) containing information 
concerning the safety of the drug. If the FDA did not disapprove the 
new drug within 60 days after it received the NDA, marketing could 
begin. 
The provisions of the Drug Amendments of 1962 caused a 
substantial increase in the time required for development and 
approval of a pioneer new drug. Beginning in 1962, the amended 
Section 505 required an NDA to contain proof of efficacy 
(effectiveness) as well as safety, and required the FDA affirmatively 
to approve the NDA rather than just to permit marketing by inaction. 
A recent study indicated that it now can take on average from 7 to 
10 years for a pharmaceutical company to satisfy the current 
regulatory requirements.  
Because most FDA-required testing is done after a patent issues, 
the remaining effective life of patent protection assertedly may be 
as low as 7 years. Litigation such as this is one example of how 
research-oriented pharmaceutical companies have sought to regain 
some of the earning time lost to regulatory entanglements. They gain 
for themselves, it is asserted, a de facto monopoly of upwards of 2 
years by enjoining FDA-required testing of a generic drug until the 
patent on the drug's active ingredient expires.43 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's holdings. It found 
that Bolar's activities were not covered by the experimental use 
exception and were not de minimis: 
Bolar's intended “experimental” use is solely for business 
reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for 
strictly philosophical inquiry. Bolar's intended use of flurazepam hcl 
to derive FDA required test data is thus an infringement of the '053 
patent. Bolar may intend to perform “experiments,” but unlicensed 
experiments conducted with a view to the adaption of the patented 
invention to the experimentor's business is a violation of the rights 
of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented invention. 
It is obvious here that it is a misnomer to call the intended use de 
minimis. It is no trifle in its economic effect on the parties even if 
																																								 																				
 42.  Id. at 860-61. 
 43. Id. at 864 (citations have been omitted to improve readability). 
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the quantity used is small. It is no dilettante affair such as Justice 
Story envisioned. We cannot construe the experimental use rule so 
broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of 
“scientific inquiry,” when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and 
not insubstantial commercial purposes.44 
II.  THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
In 1984, Congress passed the Hatch Waxman Act, which 
legislatively overruled Roche and established a clearly-defined and 
efficient route for generics to enter the market.45 The Act attempts to 
balance the interests of generic manufacturers with the need of branded 
manufacturers to recover the cost of new drug development and realize 
a profit. The Act’s most important provisions are discussed below.46 
A. Provisions of Primary Benefit to Proprietary Manufacturers 
1. Market Exclusivity 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the sponsor of a drug application 
directed to a new chemical entity is entitled to five years of data 
exclusivity from the date of approval.47 During this time, the FDA will 
not accept an application directed to the same drug.48 Due to the time 
required for approval after an application for a generic is filed, the 
market exclusivity enjoyed by the sponsor will, as a practical matter, 
likely be extended for an additional one to three years.49  
																																								 																				
 44. Id. at 863. The Court also declined Bolar's suggestion that public policy favors generic 
drugs and that it should therefore create an exception to infringement for FDA-required drug 
testing. Id. at 864. 
 45. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360cc 
(2012)).  
 46. The review of the Hatch-Waxman Act and later, the BPCIA, focuses only on those 
aspects of the legislation pertinent to the present discussion. Certain sections of the legislation 
have been simplified somewhat and others, such as those dealing with pediatric exclusivity, have 
been omitted entirely. 
 47. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (1984). Exclusivity is reduced to four years if the approved 
drug becomes the subject of an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) filed by a generic 
manufacturer and which contains a paragraph IV certification. See infra Part II, Section B.  
 48. § 314.108(b)(2). 
 49. Remarkably, it currently takes longer for the FDA to approve most abbreviated new 
drug applications (ANDAs) for a generic than it takes to approve an application for a new drug. 
This is due to a large backlog in ANDAs, and the FDA has been trying to rectify this. The FDA 
aims to eventually complete approval of applications in eight to ten months. The one to three years 
provided in the text is based on FDA numbers from 2015. Zachary Brennan, Generic Drug 
Backlog at FDA: A Dive Into the Confusing Numbers, REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y: REG. FOCUS, 
(Nov. 1, 2016), http://bit.do/RAPS_Generic-Drug-Backlog. 
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Further, the sponsor of an approved new chemical entity may later 
file a supplemental application for a new therapeutic indication, 
formulation, route of administration, or other change.50 If the 
supplemental application relies on clinical investigations that are not 
previously submitted for approval, the FDA will refrain from 
approving any other application that relies on the same clinical 
investigations for a period of three years.51 
2. Establishment of the “Orange Book” 
The Hatch-Waxman Act requires that an NDA include the number 
and expiration date of any patents that claim either the new drug or a 
method of using the new drug.52 Upon acceptance of the NDA, these 
patents are included in a list of approved drugs compiled by the FDA 
(known informally as the “Orange Book”) and may be used as a basis 
for litigation.53 
3. Litigation Under Hatch-Waxman Act (Automatic 
30-Month Stay) 
When an ANDA is filed for a generic product, it must include one 
of several statements regarding patents listed in the Orange Book as 
covering its reference drug.54 One of these statements, generally known 
as a paragraph IV certification, is essentially an assertion that the listed 
patents may be disregarded because their claims are invalid, 
unenforceable, or do not include the proposed generic product.55 In 
cases where such a certification is made, the generic applicant must, 
within 20 days of filing its application, give notice to each owner of the 
patent to which the certification pertains and provide a detailed 
explanation for the assertions made.56 The filing of an ANDA with a 
paragraph IV certification is, in itself, sufficient to constitute an act of 
infringement for any patent listed in the Orange Book and the recipients 
of the notice have a period of 45 days to file suit.57  
																																								 																				
 50. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CHANGES TO AN APPROVED 
NDA OR ANDA (Apr. 2004). 
 51. § 314.108(5)(2). 
 52. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012). The statute is silent regarding patents directed to methods 
of making drugs. 
 53. Id. 
 54. § 355(j)(2)(vii). The “reference drug” is the proprietary drug product that has been 
previously approved and is being duplicated by the generic manufacturer. 
 55. Id. See infra Subsection B.1. 
 56. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)-(iv). Notice must also be given to the NDA holder if different from 
the patent owner. 
 57. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  
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Importantly, the party that has brought the action then 
automatically receives a stay under which the ANDA will not be 
approved for thirty months unless the litigation is completed, a 
settlement is reached, or the court otherwise intervenes before the 
expiration of that period.58 In effect, the party alleging infringement 
receives a preliminary injunction without the need to actually establish 
the criteria normally required.59 The 30-month period assures the 
proprietary manufacturer that it will have an opportunity to favorably 
resolve an infringement action before a generic enters the market.60   
4. Patent Term Restoration 
In 1984, patents had a term that began running when they issued 
and lasted for 17 years thereafter.61 If the patent had claims covering a 
drug product, the portion of the term from the time of patent issuance 
to drug approval was irretrievably lost with respect to protection of the 
marketed drug. This loss however, was partly offset by the fact that, 
under Roche, testing by generic manufacturers in the U.S. could not 
begin until any patents covering their activities had expired.62  
Hatch-Waxman upset this rough balance between lost proprietary 
patent life and delayed generic market entry by introducing a safe 
harbor provision under which a generic manufacturer is permitted to 
engage in FDA-related testing before patent expiration.63 In order to 
compensate proprietary drug manufacturers, other provisions were 
included that allowed for recovery of a portion of the effective patent 
life that they had lost in getting a pioneer drug approved by the FDA.64 
Specifically, under Hatch-Waxman, a patent term may be extended by 
																																								 																				
 58. The period may be altered either by a court decision or court order. § 
355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)-(IV). If no such action is filed, the ANDA will become effective immediately 
upon approval.  
 59. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44643, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A PRIMER 7-8 (Sept. 
28, 2016). 
 60. One potential problem in this regard is the delay of litigation due to a stay ordered by 
a court for different reasons, for example, to allow the completion of an IPR action at the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board. 
 61. The term changed in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Currently 
the unadjusted term of a patent is 20 years from its effective filing date. See Karen Tripp & Linda 
Stokley, Changes in U.S. Patent Law Effected by the Uruguay Round Agreements─the GATT 
Implementation Legislation, 3 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 315, 316-17 (1995). Currently, the 
unadjusted term of a patent is 20 years from its effective filing date. Id. 
 62. Id. See also Hasneen Karbalai, The Hatch-Waxman (Im)Balancing Act, 4-5 (2003), 
http://bit.do/ImbalancingAct (unpublished J.D. thesis, Harv. Univ.) (on file with Digital Access 
to Scholarship, Harv. Univ.). 
 63. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). This is discussed below in the section describing 
advantages that Hatch-Waxman provided to generic drug makers. 
 64. This is provided in section 202 of the Act, codified in 35 U.S.C. § 156. 
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the full period of testing taking place from the time that an NDA is filed 
until the time it is approved (referred to as the “approval phase”) and 
for one half of the period from the approval of an investigational new 
drug application65 until the filing of the NDA (referred to as the “testing 
phase”).66 Adjustments are made for the portion of this period that was 
before the patent issued and for any periods during which the applicant 
did not act with diligence in completing the process.67 Taking these 
factors into account, the calculation is: 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑	𝑜𝑓	𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛	 = 	𝑅𝑅𝑃 − 𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃 − 𝐷𝐷	 − 34546347 , 
where RRP is the sum of the approval phase and testing phase; 
PGRRP is the number of days of the RRP period that pre-
dates the patent issuance date; 
DD is the number of days of the RRP that the applicant did 
not act with due diligence in completing the approval 
process; 
TP is the number of days in the testing phase; and  
PGTP is the number of days of the TP period that pre-dates 
the patent issuance date.68  
Unfortunately, the terminology used in connection with this 
statutory provision is somewhat misleading. It is not an entire patent 
(and all of its claims) that is subject to extension; rather it is only those 
aspects of the patent that relate directly to the subject matter approved 
by the FDA. Specifically, under 35 U.S.C. § 156(b), rights during the 
extension period are limited to: (a) in the case of a patent which claims 
a product, any use approved by the FDA for the product;69 (b) in the 
case of a patent which claims a method of using a product, any use 
claimed by the patent and approved for the product;70 and c) in the case 
of a patent which claims a method of manufacturing a product, the 
method of manufacturing as used to make the approved product.71 In 
addition, only one patent can be extended for a given regulatory review 
period.72 
																																								 																				
 65. An Investigational New Drug Application (“IND”) is a request for authorization from 
the FDA to administer an investigational drug or biological product to humans and generally 
precedes the filing of an NDA. See Investigational New Drug Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (Aug. 1, 2016), http://bit.do/FDA_IND-Application. 
 66. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g); MPEP § 2758 (9th ed. Rev. E9R-07.2015, Nov. 2015). 
 67. § 156(g); MPEP § 2758. 
 68. § 156(g); MPEP § 2758. 
 69. 35 U.S.C. § 156(b)(1). 
 70. § 156(b)(2). 
 71. § 156(b)(3). 
 72. § 156(c)(4). 
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B. Provisions of Primary Benefit to Generic Manufacturers 
1. Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
Although abbreviated new drug applications and paper NDAs 
existed after the 1962 amendments to the FDCA, the Hatch-Waxman 
legislation redefined and expanded these applications in a way that, for 
the first time, opened up a clear and readily-accessible route to market 
for generic drugs. Specifically, an ANDA under Hatch-Waxman can 
be filed for a generic having the same active ingredient or ingredients, 
route of administration, dosage form and strength as a “reference drug 
product” listed in the Orange Book.73 Having established the identity 
of these factors, an applicant can rely on the safety and efficacy data 
submitted to get the pioneer drug approved and generally only needs to 
conduct studies to demonstrate bioequivalence.74  
The ANDA must include a certification statement with respect to 
each patent listed in the Orange Book as covering the reference drug.75 
There are four options: 
(i) that patent information has not been filed, 
(ii) that the patent has expired, 
(iii) that the patent will expire on a specified date, or 
(iv) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the 
application is submitted.76  
The certification made by the applicant will determine when 
approval of an application becomes effective. Specifically, approval 
will be effective as soon as it is made if the certification of paragraph 
(i) or (ii) is made,77 and approval will be become effective on the 
expiration date of the patent if an applicant makes the certification of 
paragraph (iii).78 However, things get considerably more complicated 
if a paragraph (iv) certification is made as this may, by itself, trigger an 
infringement action against the ANDA applicant.79 
																																								 																				
 73. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(v). 
 74. The FDCA indicates that a generic is bioequivalent to its listed counterpart if: 
[t]he rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant difference 
from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the 
same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions 
in either a single dose or multiple doses.  
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(b)(i).  
 75. § 355(j)(2)(vii). 
 76.  Id. 
 77. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i). 
 78. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii). 
 79. §355(j)(5)(B)(iii); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). 
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Apart from a new ANDA procedure, the Hatch-Waxman Act also 
established a new type of application that is a hybrid between an NDA 
and an ANDA and is codified in 21 U.S.C. § 505(B)(2).80 Unlike the 
NDA of 21 U.S.C. § 505(B)(1), at least a portion of the support 
provided by the applicant under section (B)(2) may be derived from 
someone else's NDA data (regardless of whether the applicant has 
obtained a right of reference) or from a publication.81 These 
applications may be directed to a new chemical entity or to a new 
dosage form, strength, route of administration, or active agent.82  
2. Safe Harbor for Testing 
Hatch-Waxman overturned Roche and immunized companies 
from infringement actions for carrying out tests to meet FDA 
requirements before patents covering such activities have expired.83 
This provision was codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which reads: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or 
sell within the United States or import into the United States a 
patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary 
biological products. 
As a result, a manufacturer can be fully ready to market a generic 
product as soon as approval of an ANDA becomes effective and 
exclusivity of the reference drug owner has expired.  
3. Market Exclusivity 
As a further incentive for generic manufacturers, Hatch-Waxman 
provides that the first company to successfully file an ANDA 
application with a paragraph IV certification will receive 180 days of 
market exclusivity relative to other generic manufacturers beginning 
on the first day of commercial marketing.84 This means that for the 180-
																																								 																				
 80. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: APPLICATIONS COVERED BY 
SECTION 505(B)(2), (Oct. 1999). These applications require much more testing than an ANDA 
but much less that an application under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)-(2). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). The Act also amended patent law by adding 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(2), which makes the filing of an ANDA an act of infringement if the purpose of such 
submission is to obtain approval to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug, 
veterinary biological product, or biological product claimed in a patent or the use of which is 
claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent. 
 84. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
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day period, the first ANDA filer would be the only producer, other than 
the NDA holder, that can market the approved drug.85 
III.  COMPARING PROVISIONS OF THE BPCIA TO HATCH-WAXMAN 
The BPCIA is essentially the biologics corollary of Hatch-
Waxman,86 and there are many similarities in the structuring of the two 
Acts. Like Hatch-Waxman, the BPCIA has some provisions designed 
to primarily benefit proprietary drug manufacturers and others that 
primarily benefit follow-on manufacturers. Most of these have been 
substantially altered under the BPCIA, with the biggest changes in the 
area of litigation. In addition, there are a few Hatch-Waxman 
provisions that were not part of the BPCIA legislation at all but that are 
available for and benefit biologic drug makers. The sections below 
consider the provisions of greatest importance to companies working 
with biologics.  
A. Provisions of Primary Interest to Proprietary Manufacturers 
1. Patent Term Restoration 
Arguably, the greatest benefit to proprietary drug manufacturers 
of the Hatch-Waxman amendment is the recovery of a portion of patent 
term lost due to FDA testing. This is available regardless of whether 
the drug undergoing testing is a small, chemically-synthesized 
compound or a biologic.87 However, due to factors unique to biological 
products, the process of choosing which patent to extend may be 
somewhat different.88 
Because small molecule drugs regulated under Hatch-Waxman 
are easily synthesized, purified, and characterized, patent claims 
directed to methods of manufacturing are generally regarded as being 
easily circumvented and of relatively little value.89 It would therefore 
be unusual for a proprietary drug maker to choose a patent with claims 
to a method of manufacture as the one to extend.90 
However, this is not true for biologics. For these drugs, the 
method of production is crucial in determining their chemical and 
clinical characteristics.91 In fact, it may be difficult or impossible to 
																																								 																				
 85. Id. 
 86. Henry I. Miller, Still Awaiting the Biosimilars Revolution, 38 REG. 22, 22 (2015). 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 156. 
 88. See Brian Coggio & Peter Ludwig, Process Patents Are Vital In Biotech—Why Not 
Extend Them?, LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2015, 10:19 AM EST), http://bit.do/Law360_ProcessPatents. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. W. Nicholson Price & Arti V. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition 
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define these compounds except in terms of the way they are made and 
the way that they behave.92 Claims to methods of manufacture are 
therefore on par with claims to the compounds per se, and increasing 
the term of patents with such claims makes a good deal of sense. 93 
2. Market Exclusivity 
The BPCIA grants to the first party that successfully obtains a 
license for a biologic four years of data exclusivity (during which a 
biosimilar application cannot be filed)94 and twelve years of market 
exclusivity (during which approval of a biosimilar application will not 
be made effective).95 However, these restrictions do not apply to the 
sponsor of the reference product itself.96 The sponsor may, at any time, 
file a supplement to its approved biologics license application (BLA) 
or a subsequent BLA for either: (a) “a new indication, route of 
administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, delivery system, 
delivery device, or strength,” or (b) “a modification to the structure of 
the biological product that does not result in a change in safety, purity, 
or potency.”97 
B. Provisions of Primary Benefit to Follow-On Manufacturers  
1. Safe Harbor for Testing 
One of the main incentives for enacting Hatch-Waxman was to 
reverse Roche and provide drug manufacturers with the ability to 
perform the experiments needed to ready generics for market as soon 
as possible.98 This was done through the portion of the Act that is 
codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). However, the safe harbor is not 
confined to generics and has been held to cover a broad array of 
activities.99 Thus, it is of substantial value to companies involved in 
producing biosimilars.  
																																								 																				
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1033-35 (2016). 
 92. See id. at 1036-37 (discussing how production methods of biologics can alter their 
therapeutic effects).  
 93. Coggio & Ludwig, supra note 88.  
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B) (2015). 
 95. § 262(k)(7)(A). 
 96. § 262(k)(7)(C). 
 97. Id.  
 98. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 59, at 5. 
 99. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206-07 (2005); 
Momenta Pharm. v. Amphastar Pharm., 686 F.3d 1348, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing the 
scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)). 
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2. Abbreviated Path to Licensing 
As with the ANDA procedure for generics, applications for 
follow-on biologics are based on a comparison between the new 
follow-on product and a reference product that has already been 
evaluated and approved.100 The process is abbreviated in the sense that 
an applicant can rely on the safety and efficacy data of the reference 
product.101 However, meeting the other criteria required for approval is 
much more difficult for biosimilars than establishing that a generic has 
identical chemical characteristics and bioequivalence.  
In order to establish biosimilarity, an applicant must show that the 
proposed product is “highly similar to the reference product 
notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components” 
and that it exhibits “no clinically meaningful differences” in terms of 
safety, purity, and potency.102 The statute indicates that this is to be 
accomplished using: (a) analytical studies; (b) animal studies (which 
include an assessment of toxicity); and (c) clinical studies 
demonstrating safety, purity, and potency for a use that has been 
approved for the reference product.103 The Act further indicates that 
clinical studies should include an assessment of the immunogenicity 
and pharmacokinetics or pharmacodynamics of the proposed 
product.104  
Beyond these requirements, a biosimilar applicant must show 
that: a) the labeling proposed recommends conditions of use that have 
been approved for the reference product; b) the route of administration, 
dosage form, and strength of the proposed product are the same as the 
reference product; and c) the facility in which the biological product is 
manufactured meets standards set by the FDA.105 Finally, if the 
mechanism of action of the reference product is known with respect to 
the approved use, an applicant must show that the proposed biosimilar 
utilizes the same mechanism. 
An applicant for a biosimilar has the option of trying to establish 
that the proposed product qualifies as an “interchangeable.”106 This is 
defined as a drug that meets the criteria for being a biosimilar and 
																																								 																				
 100. WENDY H. SCHACT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41270, P.L. 111-
148: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS (May 25, 2010) at 1-3. 
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 102. § 262(i)(2). 
 103. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(aa)-(cc). 
 104. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(cc). 
 105. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II)-(IV). 
 106. §§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i), (5)(A) (stating an application for a biosimilar may only have a 
single reference product). 
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which, in addition, “can be expected to produce the same clinical result 
as the reference product in any given patient.”107 If the drug is to be 
administered more than once to an individual, the statute requires that 
“the risk in terms of safety or diminished efficacy of alternating or 
switching between use of the biological product and the reference 
product is not greater than the risk of using the reference product 
without such alternation or switch.”108 
A primary difference between a biosimilar and an interchangeable 
is that the latter may be substituted for its reference product at the 
pharmacy without the intervention of a health care provider whereas 
the former cannot.109 Thus, interchangeables have market 
characteristics closer to those of a generic than do biosimilars.110 
3. Market Exclusivity 
The BPCIA does not provide any exclusivity for a biosimilar. 
However, if a biosimilar applicant is the first to establish 
interchangeability, the FDA will not approve a second interchangeable 
for a period that is the earliest of several options. Specifically, if the 
drug is approved and marketed without litigation, then exclusivity will 
end one year after commercialization.111 However, if the 
interchangeable applicant is sued for patent infringement under 
provisions relating to the first phase of the BPCIA process,112 then 
exclusivity ends on the earliest of: (a) 18 months from the time of a 
final court decision or dismissal,113 or (b) 42 months after approval of 
the interchangeable if litigation is ongoing within the 42-month 
period.114 Finally, the statute indicates that exclusivity will end 18 
months after the date of approval if the applicant is not sued.115 By 
measuring the length of time from approval rather than 
																																								 																				
 107. See §§ 262(i)(2), (k)(4). 
 108. § 262(k)(4). 
 109. § 262(i)(3). 
 110. Approximately 40 states in the U.S. allow pharmacists to substitute a generic for a 
branded pharmaceutical without consulting with the prescribing physician. See Jeffrey J. Masters, 
Note, Not Exactly the Same: An Examination of How Generic Substitution Laws Inadequately 
Protect Consumers’ Needs if Taking Generic Drugs Results in Injuries, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 233, 
240 (2015). A smaller number allow such substitution for an interchangeable. Id. at 240-41. 
 111. § 262(k)(6)(A). 
 112. See infra Part III, Section C. Patent infringement actions under the BPCIA proceed in 
two distinct phases. The first phase begins when an application for a biosimilar is accepted by the 
FDA and the second phase occurs after an application is approved and is initiated by the biosimilar 
applicant giving notice to the reference product sponsor of its intent to commercialize the product.   
 113. § 262(k)(6)(B). 
 114. § 262(k)(6)(C)(i). 
 115. § 262(k)(6)(C)(ii). 
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commercialization, the BPCIA sets a limit on how long it will withhold 
the licensing of a second interchangeable. This prevents a situation in 
which the first interchangeable applicant approved fails to market the 
interchangeable within a reasonable period of time, e.g., due to an 
agreement with the reference product sponsor under which they 
conspire to maintain high prices by keeping additional 
interchangeables off of the market. 
C. Litigation Under the BPCIA (The “Patent Dance”) 
Some of the most complex portions of the BPCIA are concerned 
with the way in which patent disputes arising between proprietary drug 
sponsors and biosimilar applicants should be handled. The legislation 
sets forth a series of convoluted interactions that have often been 
referred to in the literature as the “patent dance,”116 which progresses 
in two distinct phases as described below.117  
1. Phase 1: Negotiation and Early Litigation 
The first phase is initiated by the FDA’s acceptance of an 
application for a biosimilar license and is designed to encourage parties 
to negotiate.118 Under current law, this phase is optional.119 If the 
biosimilar applicant chooses to enter into phase 1, it must provide the 
reference product sponsor with a copy of its application and disclose 
the process that will be used to manufacture the product no later than 
20 days after acceptance of the application by the FDA.120 The 
reference product sponsor then has 60 days to provide the applicant 
with a list of patents that could reasonably be used in an infringement 
action and indicate which patents, if any, it would be willing to 
license.121 
																																								 																				
 116. Jon Tanaka, “Shall” We Dance? Interpreting the BPCIA’s Patent Provisions, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 659, 659 (2016). 
 117. See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1363 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 118. The steps in the first and second stages of this process are summarized in Amgen Inc. 
v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1055-58 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 119. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1356-57. However, this may change. The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari for this case on January 13, 2017. See 
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., SCOTUSBLOG (last visited June 4, 2017), 
http://bit.do/SCOTUSBlog_AmgenvSandoz. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A). If the applicant does not comply with these requirements, 
then the submission of its application is deemed to constitute an act of infringement with respect 
to any patent that could have been listed. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C). 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A). The reference product sponsor may later supplement the list 
with newly-issued or licensed patents that it reasonably believes might be infringed by the 
marketing of the proposed biosimilar. § 262(l)(3)(C). 
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Once the applicant receives the patent list from the reference 
product sponsor, the applicant has 60 days to provide a reply in which 
it must explain why the proposed product would not infringe the claims 
in each patent, why the claims are not valid, or why the claims are 
unenforceable.122 It can also, optionally, list any additional patents that 
it believes could potentially be asserted in an infringement action due 
to the marketing of the proposed product.123 As an alternative, the 
applicant may provide the reference product sponsor with a statement 
that it does not intend to begin commercial marketing of the biological 
product before the date that a listed patent expires.124 
In the next step, the reference product sponsor has 60 days to reply 
with a statement refuting the arguments of the applicant and explaining 
why the patents would, in fact, be infringed.125 Once this is received, 
the parties then will have a period of 15 days to try to come to an 
agreement on which patents on the lists should be the subject of an 
infringement action.126 If they reach an agreement, then the reference 
product sponsor has a period of 30 days to file suit.127  
If instead, the parties cannot come to an agreement within the 15 
day negotiation period, they then exchange lists of patents a final time, 
but before doing so, the biosimilar applicant must inform the reference 
product sponsor of the number of patents that it, i.e., the biosimilar 
applicant, intends to list.128 The number of patents that the reference 
product sponsor lists can be no greater than the number listed by the 
biosimilar applicant except that, if the applicant chooses not to list any 
patents, the reference product sponsor can still list one.129  
Once this exchange is completed, the reference product sponsor 
has 30 days to bring a suit for infringement but can only do so with 
respect to a patent on one of the lists. Because of this, the reference 
product sponsor may have patents potentially infringed by the 
marketing of the proposed biosimilar, but which cannot be enforced 
during the first phase of the process.130  
																																								 																				
 122. § 262(l)(3)(B). The newly added patents may be enforced in phase 2 of the process but 
not in phase 1.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. § 262(l)(3)(C). 
 126. § 262(l)(4)(A). 
 127. § 262(l)(6)(A). In this regard, the BPCA made it an act of infringement to submit an 
application for a biosimilar that is covered by a patent and which appears on the negotiated list. 
This is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(5)(A). 
 129. § 262(l)(5)(B)(ii). 
 130. See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d at 1056 (“But the Biologics Act—having 
provided for a narrowing of the scope of the [§ 262(l)(6)] litigation, including by allowing the 
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2. Phase 2: Pre-Commercialization Litigation 
The second phase of the patent dance begins after the FDA 
approves a biosimilar for marketing and is much simpler than the 
first.131 It is triggered by the biosimilar applicant notifying the reference 
product sponsor of the approved license, which must occur at least 180 
days before the first date of commercial marketing.132 This notification 
requirement is mandatory regardless of whether a biosimilar applicant 
has chosen to exchange information under the first phase of the patent 
dance or not.133 Once the reference product sponsor has received 
notice, it has until the time of commercialization to request a 
preliminary injunction based on any patent included in the original lists 
of patents exchanged in phase 1, but not litigated, or with respect to 
any subsequently issued or licensed patent which had been provided to 
the biosimilar applicant within 30 days of issuance or licensing.134 
3. Limitations on Relief 
There is no legal requirement that a patent owner bring an 
infringement action against a biosimilar applicant under the provisions 
of the BPCIA. A reference drug sponsor that does not exchange patent 
lists under phase 1 of the patent dance, that omits relevant patents from 
the lists exchanged in phase 1, or that does not bring an action within 
the time limits required in 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) can still file an action 
under a different section of 35 U.S.C. § 271. However, under these 
circumstances, the only remedy available will generally be a 
reasonable royalty.135 In contrast, a sponsor that works within the 
framework of the BPCIA and fully complies with its requirements may 
be able to recover damages and obtain an injunction.136 
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF HATCH-WAXMAN TO THE BPCIA 
In the early 1900s Congress established two primary frameworks 
for regulating drugs, the Biologics Act of 1902 (currently part of the 
Public Health Service Act (“PHS”)) and the Pure Food and Drug Act 
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of 1906 (currently the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”)).137 Although these legislative lines of these Acts are 
distinct, there has historically been a good deal of overlap and 
confusion regarding their authority.138 For largely arbitrary reasons, 
there are some biologics, e.g., insulin and human growth hormone, that 
are regulated under the FDCA139 and biosimilars that have been 
approved under Section 505(b)(2).140 In addition, provisions that are 
enacted in connection with one Act sometimes extend to products 
regulated by another.141  
The overlap and confusion between the authority of the FDCA 
and PHS with regard to biologics should be substantially reduced in the 
future. Section 7002(b) of the BPCIA defines the term “biological 
product” as follows:    
The term “biological product” means a virus, therapeutic 
serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or 
derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically 
synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product, or 
arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other 
trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the 
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of 
human beings.142 
Significantly the above definition includes the phrase, “protein 
(except any chemically synthesized polypeptide).” Thus, the BPCIA 
encompasses recombinant and natural proteins that had been 
previously categorized as falling under the FDCA.143 After March of 
2020, all biologics, including these proteins, will be marketed through 
a biologic licensing application and, thereafter, the BPCIA pathway 
will be the sole one used for follow-on biologic products.144 
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF METHODS OF PRODUCTION 
Because of their size and complexity, biologics and biosimilars 
require a level of testing that is substantially greater than that needed 
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for a small molecule drug or generic in order to be approved.145 For the 
same reasons, biologics and biosimilars are more expensive to produce 
once they are on the market.146 Since manufacturers must recover the 
costs incurred in obtaining approval and the ongoing costs of making 
the products that they market, it follows that an effective plan for 
reducing the price of biologics must include a strategy for improving 
methods by which these drugs are made and tested. 
VI. FINDING THE RIGHT MIX OF INCENTIVES 
Recent analysis suggests that, relative to generics, biosimilars 
may have little impact on the cost of prescription medications in the 
U.S.147 After six months on the market, the biosimilar Zarxio was 
priced only 15% lower than its reference product and had been able to 
capture only about 10% of sales.148 By way of comparison, at six 
months, a generic would be expected to be priced more than 40% lower 
than its reference product and to have captured about 75% of sales.149  
Part of the reason why biosimilars may not be as effective at 
reducing drug prices as generics may be that the incentives provided 
under the BPCIA do not adequately take into account the differences 
between these drugs and generics.150 A biosimilar will essentially never 
be an exact duplicate of its reference drug and may occupy a market 
position between being a lower cost replacement and a product offering 
other characteristics.151 In addition, the unpredictability inherent in 
biological systems means that companies developing biosimilars face 
a much greater risk of failing to produce a product that can compete 
effectively in the marketplace. Finally, methods of manufacturing 
biosimilars are of crucial importance in determining the extent to which 
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these drugs can be marketed at lower prices than their reference 
products.  
The sections below describe several possible modifications to the 
present system that are envisioned as being used together but that, with 
some revision, could be used separately. The overall objectives are to: 
(a) promote the marketing of drug products that compete for customers 
both vertically (i.e., based primarily on price) as well as horizontally 
(i.e., based primarily on different clinical characteristics); (b) allow 
both new drug applicants and biosimilar applicants to benefit from 
innovations that they make, including innovations related to 
manufacturing; and (c) minimize the use of litigation as a tool for 
resolving differences.152 The modifications suggested are designed to 
illustrate approaches that might be taken. They are not intended to be 
complete or comprehensive.153 
A. Expanding the Use of the Purple Book 
Although not required by the BPCIA, the FDA began publishing 
the “Purple Book” in 2014 in which it lists all licensed biologics and 
biosimilars.154 The name suggests that this is the biologics counterpart 
of the Orange Book that was established by the Hatch-Waxman Act for 
drugs approved under the FDCA. However, this is not the case. The 
Purple Book currently plays no role in patent litigation and does not 
even list patents covering a licensed product.155 
This would need to change in order to meet the objectives 
discussed herein. Patents in effect at the time of approval of a biologic 
or biosimilar would need to be listed by the drug sponsor. These patents 
could be used to provide a basis for infringement actions in a way 
similar to Orange Book patents. Unlike the Orange Book, 156 however, 
the Purple Book should include not only patents claiming compositions 
and methods of use but also patents claiming methods of manufacture.  
Biosimilar manufacturers should also have an opportunity to list 
patents and use them in a similar manner to proprietary companies. For 
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example, if the biosimilar producer patented a new method for 
producing a reference product, it could list the patent in the Purple 
Book and then use it as a basis for exclusivity both against the owner 
of the reference product and against other biosimilar applicants. 
B. Using Total and Partial Exclusivity Periods 
A biologic producer is currently given 12 years of exclusivity 
from the time that a drug is approved, during which the FDA will not 
license a biosimilar.157 Interestingly, in a study of the top-selling 437 
drugs in the U.S., the study found that total market exclusivity, i.e., 
exclusivity due both to patents and FDA regulations from the time of 
FDA approval of a pioneer drug to the availability of the first generic, 
is about 12.4 years.158 Thus, if FDA-based market exclusivity were to 
be extended much beyond this, the importance of patents in 
maintaining exclusivity would be greatly diminished and litigation 
challenges to patents should decrease accordingly.159 A longer term 
would also have the effect of giving drug makers an extended period to 
recover production costs and potentially encourage them to reduce 
prices somewhat. However, extending exclusivity also means that the 
benefits of biosimilar entry on price reduction and innovation would be 
lost. 
One way to balance these factors is to divide an approved 
product's exclusivity term into a relatively short period of total 
exclusivity, e.g., seven years, and a much longer period of partial 
exclusivity, e.g., an additional 15 years. During the initial period, the 
FDA would not approve a biosimilar application and during the latter 
period of partial exclusivity, the reference product owner would 
receive royalty payments from biosimilar producers. 
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C. Promoting Innovation and Competition 
From the perspective of proprietary drug manufacturers, the main 
problem with the exclusivity provided by the FDA is that it is of very 
narrow scope.160 It is confined to a drug with specific clinical 
characteristics used in the treatment of a specific condition.161 This 
protects the manufacturer from the untimely entry of biosimilars on to 
the market but does not stop the entry of closely-related products that 
compete as an alternative.162 This problem may be offset through the 
use of patents, which have the potential of providing broader 
protection. However, patents must be enforced by litigation and are 
highly susceptible to invalidation in post-grant review proceedings at 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.163 What is desired is a system 
that allows a manufacturer to recover for the innovations it has made 
(not just for bringing a product to market), that discourages litigation, 
and that provides a reasonable assurance of recovery of drug 
development and marketing costs.  
One way to address this would be to fix the term of exclusivity 
based on FDA provisions but determine the scope of exclusivity based 
on patents covering the licensed product. Specifically, a pioneer drug 
producer might be granted exclusivity based on FDA approval and this 
would cover, as it does now, the approved drug product and use. 
Beyond this, however, the obligation to compensate the drug sponsor 
would be determined by the scope of any patents identified in the FDA 
Purple Book as covering the product, the use of the product, and the 
method of making the product.  
Continuing the example suggested above, there might be a period 
of seven years where a proprietary manufacturer is given total 
exclusivity based on FDA approval alone and 15 years of partial 
exclusivity during which it has FDA exclusivity and patent exclusivity. 
FDA exclusivity would apply to products granted as biosimilars and 
would not depend at all on patent protection. Therefore, a biosimilar 
sponsor would be required to pay the statutory royalty unless it had 
some basis for alleging that the reference product should not have been 
listed by the FDA. The scope, validity, and enforceability of patents 
would be irrelevant. 
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Patent exclusivity would apply to new biologics that do not 
qualify as biosimilars but are so closely related to a listed drug that they 
fall within the scope of one or more patents listed in the Purple Book. 
In one possible scenario, notifications of all approvals would be 
published by the FDA and would be followed by a period of delay, e.g., 
90 days, before the approved product could be marketed. During this 
time, any party with a patent listed in the Purple Book could seek an 
injunction, if their period of total exclusivity had not yet expired, or 
demand the payment of a statutorily set royalty, if their product was in 
the period of partial exclusivity and the newly-approved product 
infringed one or more claims in a listed patent. If the party with the 
newly-approved product agreed to make payments, it would be 
immune from litigation by the patent owner. If instead it refused, it 
would be subject to an action for infringement.164  
This scenario has a number of benefits that do not exist under the 
current BPCIA framework. When combined with the provisions 
discussed below, it provides a path for infringing drug products to enter 
the market that would not otherwise be possible. Specifically, the 
sponsor of the newly-approved product could avoid an infringement 
action by respecting the patentee’s period of total exclusivity and 
agreeing to pay royalties for the period of partial exclusivity. The patent 
owner, gets a guarantee of seven years of complete exclusivity and 15 
years of royalty payments for biosimilars which cannot be lost due to 
patents being invalidated. In addition, the patent owner gets an 
opportunity to be compensated for other innovations that it has made 
and patented.    
Provisions designed to discourage litigation could also be 
incorporated into the system. For example, if the owner of a newly-
approved application refused to pay royalties and subsequently lost in 
an action for infringement, it might be subject to an injunction keeping 
its product off of the market until the period of exclusivity for the patent 
owner has completely expired. Similarly, if the proprietary 
manufacturer brought an action and lost, it might be required to forfeit 
any right to receive royalties (either FDA-based or patent-based) from 
the applicant and, in cases where the litigation was clearly unwarranted, 
be required to pay some or all of the applicant's litigation costs.  
If patent claims were found to be invalid in reexamination, inter 
partes review or litigation in actions that do not arise from the events 
related to drug approval, the patents would be removed from the Purple 
Book’s list. 
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D. Expanding Patent Term Restoration 
To better suit them for the roles discussed above, all patents listed 
in the Purple Book, as covering some aspect of a biologic or biosimilar, 
would need to receive an automatic extension of term to be coextensive 
with the exclusivity granted as a result of FDA approval. The scope of 
patent protection for the extended term would be limited to 
enforcement in actions arising from the filing of an application for a 
new biologic or biosimilar or the marketing of a biologic or biosimilar. 
Unlike the current requirements for term extension, more than one 
patent would need to be subject to extension for a given period of 
exclusivity and the extension would apply to all existing claims. 
E. Expanding the Safe Harbor 
The exemption from infringement that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
provides to companies making, using, or offering to sell patented 
subject matter for the purpose of fulfilling federal regulatory 
requirements already extends to biologics licensed under the Public 
Health Service Act.165 This safe harbor from infringement was 
originally designed to allow generic manufacturers to make copies of 
reference drugs and conduct tests necessary to get approval of an 
ANDA.166 However, the statute has been broadly interpreted by courts 
to allow for many activities, including testing for the purpose of new 
product development.167  
Because true copies of reference products are usually not possible 
when one is dealing with biologics,168 the safe harbor takes on an 
additional role for companies making these types of drugs. It provides 
them with an opportunity to explore how changes in production 
methods result in products with different clinical characteristics and an 
opportunity to collect data that can either be used to file an application 
for a biosimilar or, in cases where the products are found to have 
benefits that the reference product does not, to file an application for 
an entirely new biologic.169 Thus, testing may result in products that 
compete with the reference product primarily on the basis of price as 
well as products that compete based on their distinct characteristics. 
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In the regulatory scheme proposed above, the safe harbor would 
be expanded to provide that it shall not be an act of infringement to file 
an application for a biosimilar license or to market a biosimilar 
provided that commercial sales do not begin during the first seven years 
after the reference product was approved and provided that the 
applicant complies with statutory licensing requirements, including 
paying the sponsor of the reference product the statutory royalty fee. 
Similarly, it should not be an act of infringement to file an application 
for, or market, a new biologic product that is covered by a patent listed 
in the Purple Book for a pioneer drug, provided that commercial sales 
do not begin during the first seven years from the approval date of the 
pioneer drug and provided that the applicant complies with statutory 
licensing requirements, including paying the sponsor of the pioneer 
drug the statutory royalty fee. 
F. Promoting Improvements in Methods of Manufacturing 
Biologics 
What a biologic is depends on the way that it is made, and it is 
very difficult to predict the effect that changes in methods of 
production will have on the clinical characteristics of a biological 
product.170 Although this means that biosimilar development carries 
risks that the development of a generic drug does not,171 it also means 
that there is an increased chance of discovering products with improved 
characteristics and for the introduction innovative procedures. In this 
sense, a company attempting to make a biosimilar is much closer to 
being in the position of a new drug developer than a company making 
a generic version of a small molecule drug.  
Biosimilar development efforts have the potential of producing 
three different results: (a) a product with essentially the same clinical 
characteristics as the reference drug; (b) a product that has different and 
beneficial characteristics compared to the reference drug; and (c) a 
product that is either nonfunctional or inferior to the reference product. 
If, as a result of efforts to make a biosimilar, a company finds a drug 
with substantially improved characteristics compared to the reference 
product, FDA regulations provide an incentive for the filing of an 
application for a new biologic license.172  
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Unfortunately, there is relatively little incentive given to a 
biosimilar developer for finding a method of producing a biosimilar 
that is essentially the same as its reference product but where the cost 
of production is much lower.173 Currently, a follow-on developer gets 
no exclusivity unless they conduct further tests and establish 
interchangeability. However, it is not generally clear whether the 
benefit that this provides justifies the additional testing and expense.174 
This may be remedied by granting a biosimilar producer exclusivity 
similar to that provided to a new product. Specifically, the sponsor 
would get a short period of complete exclusivity for their method of 
production (e.g., one year) and a period of partial exclusivity matching 
the remaining term of the reference product. During the latter, the 
biosimilar producer would receive a statutorily-fixed royalty from 
other companies making the reference product by the method 
developed. As with a new biologic, the biosimilar maker could expand 
the scope of their exclusivity by listing patents. 
G. Litigation 
Although one of the objectives of the BPCIA may have been to 
avoid the need for litigation, it does not appear to be successful in this 
regard, at least in part due to the convoluted nature of the patent dance 
and inconsistencies in the text of the statute.175 Likely the best way to 
improve this is to eliminate the patent dance and to rewrite the statute 
entirely. Litigation could then be performed in accordance with the 
various suggestions made above.  
If an application for a biologic was judged by the applicant to fall 
within the scope of the claims of a product listed in the Purple Book, 
or if the applicant simply wanted to avoid potential litigation, a 
certification statement could be included as part of the licensing 
application identifying the relevant product and stating that the 
applicant would not market the drug until the initial period of total 
exclusivity had elapsed and thereafter would pay a statutory royalty for 
the remaining term of exclusivity. In cases where such statement was 
made, the applicant would not be subject to an infringement action.  
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CONCLUSION 
In 1983, prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, only 
about 13% of prescriptions were for generics.176 Ten years after 
enactment, the percentage had risen to 36% and, by 2012, to 84%.177 
The BPCIA was modeled on the Hatch-Waxman Act in the hope that 
it would have a similar effect on the marketing of biosimilars and 
ultimately lead to a dramatic decrease in the price of biologics. 
However, factors affecting the market for biosimilars are substantially 
different from those for generics and there are good reasons to think 
that the effect will be much smaller.178  
Part of the reason for the limited prospects for biosimilars 
regulated under the BPCIA is that the structural complexity and nature 
of biologics makes it much more expensive to develop and produce 
these drugs.179 Unless incentives are present that encourage innovation 
in general, and particularly innovations in the methods by which these 
molecules are made, it is difficult to see how biologics will become 
affordable to the great majority of people that need them.180 Although 
the BPCIA, in its present state, does little in this regard, it may be 
possible to amend its provisions to encourage innovation more 
effectively. This is something that should not be overlooked by 
Congress as they consider replacing portions of the ACA. 
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